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 2 
The Role of Accountancy Firms in Tax Avoidance: Some Evidence 
and Issues 
 
Abstract 
 
As entrepreneurial businesses, accountancy firms have supplemented their traditional 
trade of selling accounting and auditing services by diversifying into a variety of other 
products and services. They have developed organisational struc tures and strategies to 
sell tax avoidance schemes to corporations and wealthy individuals. The sale of such 
services shifts tax burdens to less mobile capital and less well-off citizens. It also 
erodes the tax base and brings the firms into direct conflict with the state. This paper 
provides some evidence of the strategies and tactics used by accountancy firms to sell 
schemes that enable their clients to avoid corporate, sales and payroll taxes. Such 
strategies stimulate reflections upon the possible trajectories in the development of 
accountancy firms and social consequences of their trade. 
 
 
Key words: Accountancy firms, commercialisation, tax avoidance, offshore finance. 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
 
The neo- liberal economic theories facilitating globalization have so reduced territorial 
frontiers that capital roams the world looking for jurisdictions and networks that offer 
a refuge for high profits, low tax and minimal social obligations jurisdictions. The 
triumphant march of global capitalism may produce enormous economic activity, 
trade and wealth, but it is also accompanied by extreme poverty, social exclusion and 
huge inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth, and quality of life for 
everyone. The dismantling of exchange controls and trade barriers, accompanied by 
innovations in communications technologies, has encouraged the development of a 
rapacious tax avoidance industry, with ordinary citizens, equality, democracy, justice 
and fairness as the visible casualties. 
 
Despite record corporate profits and economic growth, over four billion people live on 
less than $2 a day; 1.8 billion people lack access to electricity. In 1960, at the dawn of 
large-scale tax avoidance, the richest 20 percent in the world accounted for about 70 
percent of total income. However, by 2000, that figure had reached 85 percent 1. Over 
the same period, the fraction of income accruing to the poorest 20 percent in the world 
fell from 2.3 percent to 1.1 percent (Prahalad, 2004). A United Nations report 
estimates that in 2003, 640 million children did not have adequate shelter, 400 million 
do not have access to safe water, 270 million have no access to health services and 
140 million had never been to school. More than 10 million child deaths were 
recorded in 2003 and almost half a million children aged under-fifteen died of Aids, 
while a further 630,000 children were infected with HIV. By 2003 some 2.1 million 
children under-fifteen were living with HIV/Aids, mostly infected during pregnancy, 
birth or through breast- feeding (UNICEF, 2004; also see International Labour 
Organisation, 2004). 
 
These inequalities are also a feature of affluent countries. In Britain, world’s fourth 
biggest and Europe’s second richest economy, the share of wealth enjoyed by the 
poorest 50% of the population has shrunk from 10 per cent in 1986 to 5 per cent in 
2002 (New Statesman, 7 March 2005). One-in-three children (3.8 million children) 
                                                 
1 400 richest American’s are estimated to have personal wealth of over $1 trillion 
(Forbes 2004 list of the richest Americans published on 24 September 2004). In 
financial terms this is bigger than the GDP of India, home to some 1.1 billion people. 
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live in poverty (Barnardo’s, 2003). Some  16% of the population lives below poverty 
line and 22% of the adults are functionally illiterate. Public expenditure on education 
is the lowest as percentage of the GDP, since the early 1960s (The Guardian, 4 
September 2001, p. 1). Due to inadequate income and resources, some 12.8 million 
Britons may be unable to make adequate provision for retirement (The Guardian, 12 
October 2004). Currently, almost two million pensioners live in poverty, over half a 
million over-65s are undernourished and risk ill-health due to poor diet and over 
22,000 pensioners die each year from cold and related illnesses (Age Concern press 
release, 21 December 2004). According to the Royal National Institute for the Blind 
(Daily Mail, 30 October 2001, p. 30), between 17 and 22 per cent of school-age 
children have poor eyesight, but have not had an eye test. The incidence of brain 
cancer amongst children is 36% higher than in the 1950s and the rate of acute 
lymphoblastic leukaemia has gone up by one-third (Daily Mail, 18 December 2001, p. 
22). Unlike any other EU country, TB is on the increase in Britain. In 2002, there 
were 6,891 cases compared to 5,798 in 1992 (The Guardian, 3 August 2004). England 
and Wales have one lung specialist for every 119,000 people, compared to a European 
average of one for 60,000 patients (Daily Mail, 24 October 2000, p. 24). The 
unemployment benefit in Britain is lower than elsewhere in Western Europe and 
fewer people out of work in Britain receive unemployment benefits. The unemployed 
in Spain receive 77% of the country’s average earnings. In Britain, unemployed 
persons only receive 30%, and this is available for only six months, after which 
various social assistance benefits can be obtained, but they are low enough to leave 
many in a poverty trap. In Sweden and Denmark, benefits adding up to 60% of the 
average wage can be claimed for up to five years.  
 
People may look to elected governments to make the necessary investment in social 
infrastructure and eradicate social inequalities or use the taxation system to 
redistribute wealth and enable more people to live fulfilling lives, but such aspirations 
are increasingly checked by the tax avoidance industry dominated by accountants, 
lawyers and bankers. Britain may be losing more than £100 billion of tax revenues2 
each year (Lyssiotou et al., 2004; Marsden, 2004). In 2001, the US is estimated to 
                                                 
2 The UK government has refused to publish any official estimates (Hansard, House 
of Commons Debates, 2 November 2004, col. 154W; 8 January 2004, col. 425; 12 
March 2003, col. 285). 
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have lost nearly $311 billion, up from $32 billion in 1973 (US Senate Committee on 
Finance, 2004), large enough to finance a free healthcare service for all citizens.  
Nearly 60% of US corporations paid zero federal taxes from 1996 to 2000 (US 
General Accountability Office, 2004a). Developing countries may try to expand their 
economies to provide jobs, public goods and social investment, but the tax avoidance 
industry is not far away. For example, tax avoidance is depriving China of more than 
30 billion Yuan (US$3.6 billion) in lost tax revenues annually (China Daily, 25 
November 2004) where almost “90 per cent of the foreign enterprises are making 
money under the table. …… most commonly, they use transfer pricing to dodge tax 
payments” (China People’s Daily, 25 November 2004). Developing countries are 
estimated to be losing more than US$50 billion of tax revenues each year (Oxfam, 
2000) whilst paying £100 million (or around US$190 million) a day in debt 
repayments alone to richer countries (Oxfam, 2004). Deprived of social investment, 
average life expectancy in some African nations has declined to just 33 years. 
 
The global tax avoidance industry is attracting increasing attention by policymakers 
(for example, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998, 2000; 
Financial Action Task Force, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Financial Stability Forum, 2000; 
US General Accountability Office, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; UK Home Office, 1998) and 
scholars (for example, see Hampton, 1996; Palan, 2003), but comparatively little 
scholarly attention is focused upon the role of accountancy firms in facilitating tax 
avoidance (Mitchell et al., 2002; Sikka, 2003). Concerned legislators and opinion 
formers have pointed the finger at accountancy firms for devising and mass marketing 
tax avoidance schemes. For example, a US Senate Subcommittee concluded that 
“dubious tax shelter sales were ….. assigned to talented professionals at the top of 
their fields and able to draw upon vast resources and reputations of the country’s 
largest accounting firms ……. Whose products generated hundreds of millions of 
dollars in phony tax losses for taxpayers, using a series of complex, orchestrated 
transactions, structured finance, and investments with little or no profit potential” (US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005, p. 9, 10). In his evidence 
(18 November 2003) to the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
Senator Joseph Lieberman said that “ranks of lawyers, accountants, and financial 
consultants have abused the law and their own professional ethics simply for the sake 
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of huge sums of money to be made helping their clients evade taxes3”. Senator Carl 
Levin added that “accountants are cooking up these deceptive schemes, and which are 
then going out and mass marketing these schemes to people who had made a major 
amount of money or had big profits in the last year4”. A UK legislator stated that 
“Britain’s corporation tax revenues are under relentless attack from several 
multinational companies and the global accountancy firms’ mass production of tax 
avoidance” (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 February 2005, col. 392).  
 
This paper provides some evidence about the involvement of accountancy firms in 
developing and selling tax avoidance schemes. Such evidence can help in 
understanding the trajectories in the expansion of entrepreneurial accountancy firms, 
contrasting with their expressed claims of ethical conduct and ‘social responsibility’. 
This paper contains three further sections. The first of these argues that in the pursuit 
of higher profits and earnings, accountancy firms have diversified into selling tax 
avoidance schemes even though it brings them into conflict with the state and civil 
society. Such activities are facilitated by broader capitalist concerns about increasing 
profits and reducing social obligations. The second section provides evidence from 
publicly available sources and shows that accountancy firms are actively involved in 
selling schemes that enable their clients to avoid corporate, sales and payroll taxes. 
The third section concludes the paper by considering some social implications of this  
commercialisation of accountancy firms. 
 
2.  PROFESSIONALISM AND PURSUIT OF PROFITS 
 
In societies marked by divisions of expert labour, accountants distinguish themselves 
from competing occupational groups by drawing attention to a number of traits or 
characteristics (Millerson, 1964). These include claims of theoretical and practical 
knowledge, high level of skills, ethical conduct and social responsibility. Appeals to 
such idealised self- images help to solicit trust and legitimise professional power. They 
are part of the politics that enable accountants to secure considerable work autonomy 
and define the needs of clients and society (Flint, 1988). However, accountancy firms 
                                                 
3http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=PressReleases.View&PressRelease_id
=580&Affiliation=R; accessed 25 November 2003. 
4 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/interviews/levin.html; accessed 
21 February 2004. 
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do not simply trade by appealing to idealised claims. As entrepreneurial businesses, 
they constantly reinvent themselves (Daly and Schuler, 1998) and translate their 
images and technical knowledge claims into fees and markets by stimulating demands 
for new products and services and by creating appropriate organisational cultures, 
structures and strategies to meet and expand them (Larson, 1977; MacDonald, 1995). 
  
Historically, the state guaranteed monopoly of external auditing has been the making 
of accountancy firms. Unlike other consultancy businesses, it gives them 
comparatively easy access to company executives and provides an opening to impress 
potential clients with zeal about meeting deadlines, attention to detail, the value of 
surveillance, judgement, control and related implications of cutting costs and 
inefficiencies (Willmott and Sikka, 1997). Until, the late 1960s, accounting and 
auditing services formed the ‘core business’ for accountancy firms, but their relative 
contribution to firm profits has stagnated. In common with other capitalist enterprises, 
accountancy firms have sought to mobilise their technical knowledge to develop 
complementary products and adjacent markets, including the sale of tax avoidance 
schemes (Sikka and Willmott, 1995a; Financial Reporting Council, 2005). In addition 
to cementing jurisdictional claims (Abbott, 1988) and increasing the partners’ share of 
profits (Burrows and Black, 1998), the expansion into tax avoidance services exploits 
deeply ingrained individualist discourses claiming that “every man is entitled if he can 
to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it 
otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, 
however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers 
may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax” (IRC v. 
Duke of Westminster (1936) 19 TC 490, [1936] AC 1). Such discourses are amplified 
and an Ernst & Young partner specialising in selling tax services clamed that “We 
pride ourselves in being a liberal economy; the central feature of such an economy is  
that residents are free to undertake the activities that they wish [avoid taxes], provided 
the activities are not unlawful” (Irish Times, 7 May 2004). 
 
As commercial concerns, accountancy firms prioritise private profits and encourage 
competitive individualism, with an emphasis on retaining clients, pleasing the 
customer and promoting business virtues that increase profits (Grey, 1998; Barrett et 
al., 2005). To sell tax avoidance and other services, firms need to develop 
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organisational cultures and practices that place increasing emphasis upon the  
commercial acumen of their staff and it is this commercial acumen, rather than the 
ethical conduct, or even the technical ability of the firms’ staff that is increasingly 
promoted as the primary measure of their trustworthiness. As a partner of a major 
accountancy firm put it, “a firm like ours is a commercial organization and the bottom 
line is that …... first of all the individual must contribute to the profitability of the 
business. In part that is bringing in business but essentially profitability is based upon 
the ability to serve existing clients well” (Hanlon, 1994, p. 121).  
 
Accountancy firms are part of the contemporary ‘enterprise culture’ that persuades 
many to believe that ‘bending the rules’ for personal gain is a sign of business 
acumen. Stealing a march on a competitor to make money, at almost any price, is 
considered to be an entrepreneurial skill, especially where competitive pressures link 
promotion, status, profits, markets and niches with meeting business targets (Sikka, 
2004). The intellectual and moral outlook of employees is shaped by socialisation and  
inculcation from senior staff that emphasises retention of clients. Such practices are 
given visibility by senior partners instructing staff that “The first requirement is to 
continue to be at the beck and call of RM [Robert Maxwell5 was chairman of the 
company], his sons and staff, appear when wanted and provide whatever is required” 
(UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2001, p. 367). In pursuit of profits, firms have 
been keen to retain known problematical clients on the grounds that they are “a big 
fee account” (Joint Disciplinary Scheme, 2004). Such a focus on private profits does 
not appear to be accompanied by concerns about public obligations, persuading 
Hanlon (1994) to conclude that within major firms the “emphasis is very firmly on 
being commercial and on performing a service for the customer rather than on being 
public spirited on behalf of either the public or the state” (Hanlon, 1994, p. 150).  
 
The commercialisation of accountancy firms is shaping and is shaped by broader 
changes in contemporary capitalism where traditional values are being increasingly 
eclipsed by search for higher earnings and financial rewards. An official report from 
the UK government notes that business acumen is increasingly accompanied by 
“cynical disregard of laws and regulations ….. cavalier misuse of company monies 
                                                 
5 Robert Maxwell became notorious for stealing £458 million from his employees’ 
pension funds. 
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…[and] ….. a contempt for truth and common honesty” (UK Department of Trade 
and Industry, 1997, p. 309). Stimulated by recurring crisis of profitability, intense 
competition and pressures to increase earnings, capitalist enterprises constantly seek 
new ways of boosting earnings by developing complex structures and by rewarding 
advisers who can find novel ways of increasing earnings. In part, this is also a 
response to the pressures upon executives whose own earnings, bonuses and rewards 
are linked to higher reported earnings. One of the strategies has been to cut ‘costs’ by 
reducing or avoiding tax obligations as unlike redundancies and factory closures such 
reductions remain relatively invisible. In contemporary entrepreneurial culture, tax 
avoidance is promoted as a natural, inevitable and a desirable pursuit. For example, an 
Ernst & Young tax partner claimed that “Tax is a cost of doing business so, naturally, 
a good manager will try to manage this cost and the risks associated with it. This is an 
essential part of good corporate governance6” (Irish Times, 7 May 2004). 
Accountancy firms have long been identified as key players in the ‘rules avoidance’ 
industry7 (Sikka and Willmott, 1995a) and have further enhanced their credentials by 
developing and marketing a variety of tax avoidance schemes to enable their audit 
clients and others to report higher profits (US General Accountability Office, 2005).  
 
The opportunities to sell other services, including tax avoidance schemes, have fuelled 
the global growth and expansion of accountancy firms. Paralleling the expansion of 
multinational corporations, major accountancy firms have forged networks and 
organisational presence in virtually every major country and city. For example, 
KPMG8 member firms employ over 100,000 people to provide audit, tax, and 
advisory services from 715 cities in 148 countries; Deloitte & Touche member firms 
employ 115,000 people in 148 countries and 670 cities; Ernst & Young member firms 
employ nearly 106,000 people in 670 cities in 140 countries and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) member firms employ 130,000 people in 768 cities in 
139 countries. This vast network enables the firms to meet demands of local capital 
with global solutions i.e. their clients can choose from a variety of tax avoidance and 
related packages that may have initially been developed for other jurisdictions. The 
                                                 
6 Such a view is contested by Christensen and Kapoor, 2004. 
7 As the chairman of Coopers & Lybrand (now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers) put 
it, "there is an industry developing, and we are part of it, in standards avoidance" 
(Accountancy Age, 19 July 1990, p. 1). 
8 Information is taken from the most recent annual review of the relevant firm. 
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worldwide presence has enabled the Big Four firms to generate global income of $55 
billion global income and become the 53rd biggest economy in the world (Cousins et 
al., 2004). Firms have expanded their consultancy operations (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2005) and selling tax avoidance schemes is a major source of revenues 
(Mitchell et al., 2002). Even after public exposure of their role in selling dubious tax 
avoidance schemes to Enron and WorldCom (US Senate Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 2003; United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, 
2004), major firms and their trade associations have vigorously opposed any 
restrictions on the sale of taxation services to audit clients. For example, a 
spokesperson for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
said that “the institute won’t oppose legislation for a limited ban on consulting 
services … won’t object to a ban on information-technology consulting or internal 
auditing …. But it will oppose one on tax related consulting9”. In response of intense 
lobbying, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 did not place any significant curbs on the 
sale of tax avoidance schemes to audit clients. The UK’s revised ethical standards do 
not ban the sale of tax avoidance schemes to audit clients either or require 
accountancy firms to make any public disclosures about such activities (Auditing 
Practices Board, 2004). Such a regulatory climate provides the firms with numerous 
opportunities for developing and marketing tax avoidance schemes. 
 
3. ACCOUNTANTS AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
The intensification of commercialisation of accountancy firms is highly evident in 
their strategies for selling tax avoidance schemes. The sale of tax avoidance schemes 
is not a new phenomenon; however what is interesting is the variety of schemes and 
the tactics used by accountancy firms to sell them. This section provides some 
evidence by drawing attention to the strategies used to sell schemes that help clients to 
avoid corporate, sales and payroll taxes. 
 
3.1 Corporate Taxes 
 
The demise of US-based energy company Enron focussed worldwide public attention 
on organised large-scale tax avoidance. Enron, with 25,000 employees and $50 billion 
assets became America’s biggest corporate bankruptcy. A US Senate report (US 
                                                 
9 http://www.aicpa.org/info/aicpa_update_3.htm; accessed 20 November 2004. 
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Senate Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003) found that the company operated through 
a global web of 3,500 domestic and foreign subsidiaries and affiliates, including 441 
registered in the Cayman Islands tax haven10, many of whom never traded but enabled 
the company to structure its transactions and avoid taxes. Enron’s highly complex tax 
avoidance schemes were designed by Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Chase 
Manhattan, Deutsche Bank, Bankers Trust and several major law firms, who 
according to the Senate report received around $88 million in fees. Enron’s published 
accounts showed net income of $2.3 billion for the period 1996 to 1999, but for tax 
purposes claimed to have a loss of $3 billion. It paid no tax for 1996 to 1999. For the 
year 2000, it reported taxable income of $3.1 billion, but for tax purposes it claimed a 
loss of $4.6 billion, a calculation now disputed by the US tax authorities. Many of the 
transactions had no commercial substance and were designed solely to avoid taxes not 
only in the US but also in places such as India and Hungary. So complex were the tax 
avoidance schemes that a 2,700 page report by the US Senate was barely able to 
introduce them (US Senate Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003).  
 
The demise of WorldCom, another US giant, also focused attention on tax avoidance 
or what was internally referred to as a ‘tax minimization program’. A report by 
WorldCom’s bankruptcy examiner concluded that “WorldCom likely avoided paying 
hundreds of millions of dollars in state taxes in 1998-2001 based upon the accrua l of 
over $20 billion in questionable royalty charges. The cornerstone of  this program, 
which was designed by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (“KPMG”), the classification of 
the “foresight of top management” (“management foresight”) as an intangible asset, 
which the parent company could license11 to the subsidiaries in return for massive 
charges” (United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, 2004, p. 3). 
The “foresight of top management” is unlikely to be found as an ‘intangible asset’ in 
any accounting text-book12. However, it could be conceptualised as management’s 
strategy to create a horizontally and vertically integrated corporate structure to 
provide a range of service to customers, something any company would strive for. To 
                                                 
10 Cayman Islands, in common with many other tax havens, do not levy any tax on 
income and profits. 
11 A variety of trademarks and trade names were also licensed to WorldCom 
subsidiaries. 
12 In accounting, something is considered to be an asset if meets a number of tests, 
including its severability and ability to be sold to third parties for cash. 
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minimise taxes, a WorldCom company registered in a favourable tax jurisdiction 
claimed ownership of the newly designed asset. Since the whole WorldCom group 
relied upon management abilities, all companies had to pay a royalty for its use. For 
the period 1998-2001, these companies paid $20 billion in royalty fees. The paying 
companies got tax relief on the payment of royalties, but since the receiving company 
was located in a favourable tax jurisdiction it paid little or no tax on most of its 
income. The transaction was internal to the WorldCom group and had no net effect on 
its global profits but saved millions in taxes. KPMG collected nearly $10 million in 
fees. The bankruptcy examiner added that the company’s royalty programs “lacked 
economic substance …….  the “management foresight” that KPMG identified was not 
an intangible asset ……. The company and KPMG apparently failed to explain the 
true nature of the Royalty Programs to taxing authorities …… “(pp. 37-41).  
 
Revelations at Enron, WorldCom and other scandals persuaded the US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to closely examine the tax avoidance 
industry. Major accountancy firms, law firms and banks confirmed that were major 
sellers of tax avoidance schemes. In the words of an Ernst & Young partner, “The 
stock market boom and the proliferation of stock option awards in the 1990s created 
an unprecedented number of individual taxpayers with large gains and significant 
potential tax liabilities ……. We and other firms looked for legitimate and appropriate 
tax planning ideas. Perhaps, reflecting the tenor of the times these efforts rapidly 
evolved into competitive and widespread marketing of those ideas13”. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ senior tax partner told the subcommittee that “In the 1990s 
there was increasing pressure in the marketplace for firms to develop aggressive tax 
shelters that could be marketed to large numbers of taxpayers ….. regrettably, our 
firm became involved in three types of these transactions 14”. However, the Senate 
Subcommittee homed in on KPMG because in the words of one of its members, “this 
was one of the worst perpetrators ……. they were involved more heavily than any 
other firm that we could find 15”.  
                                                 
13Testimony by Mark Weinberger on 18 November 2003;  http://govt-
aff.senate.gov/_files/111803weinberger.pdf; accessed 21 November 2003. 
14 Testimony by Richard Berry on 18 November 2003; http://govt-
aff.senate.gov/_files/111803berry.pdf; accessed 21 November 2003.  
15 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/interviews/levin.html; accessed 
21 February 2004. 
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KPMG16 told the Senate Committee that it had over 500 “active tax products17” and 
that the firm’s strategy was to become “an industry leader in producing generic tax 
products” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 2 and 25). 
Some of these products were developed in collaboration with the firm’s audit clients18 
and also sold to a number of audit clients (p.15, 55). The ‘tax products’ were 
marketed and executed through a network of law firms, banks, investment advisory 
firms and charitable organisations. Just four of these schemes, three of which may 
have been illegal, may have netted the firm $180 million in fees and helped to swell 
its fees for tax services from $829 million in 1998 to $1.2 billion in 2001 (New York 
Times, 11 February 2005). At the same time the US Treasury may have lost $85 
billion of tax revenues (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, 
p. 21; USA Today, 18 November 2003; New York Times, 11 February 2005). The 
Senate report concluded that “none of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee 
derived from a request by a specific corporation or individual for tax planning advice 
on how to structure a specific business transaction in a tax efficient way; rather all of 
the transactions examined by the Subcommittee involved generic tax products that 
had been affirmatively developed by a firm and then vigorously marketed to 
numerous, in some cases thousands, of potential buyers” (p. 2). 
 
KPMG had an elaborate organisational structure for developing and marketing tax 
avoidance schemes, including a ‘Tax Innovation Center’ whose sole mission was to 
develop new tax products (p. 30). It operated a “Tax Services Idea Bank” and invited 
staff to submit new ideas for tax products on an internal form which also asked 
submitter to explain the revenue potential, typical buyer and key target markets. The 
‘center’ operated as a profit centre and was subjected to a performance monitoring 
regime. KPMG maintained an extensive marketing infrastructure to sell its tax 
products, including a telemarketing centre staffed with people trained to make cold 
calls to find buyers for specific tax products. The Senate reports stated that the firm 
                                                 
16 The firm has close relationship with the UK state and has advised the government 
on possible reforms of tax havens (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2000). 
17 They are also referred to as “tax solutions” or “tax strategies” (US Senate 
Permanent subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 26) 
18 These included Deutsche Bank, HVB and Wachovia Bank, and inevitably raise 
some questions about auditor independence and possible conflict of interests. 
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“utilized confidential and sensitive client data in an internal database containing 
information used by KPMG to prepare client tax returns in order to identify potential 
targets for its tax products” (p. 9). Tax professionals and audit staff were required to 
work together to sell and implement the product and internal communications told 
staff that the tax product is a “collection of assurance and tax services designed to 
assist companies in …….. realizing value from intellectual property …… delivered by 
joint team of KPMG assurance and tax professionals ….. to increase KPMG’s market 
penetration of key clients and targets by enhancing the linkage between Assurance 
and Tax professionals” (p. 54) 
 
In the secretive world of tax avoidance and concerns about intellectual property, 
KPMG required some potential purchasers to sign “nondisclosure agreements” (p. 
14). Client presentations were done on chalkboards or erasable whiteboards, and 
written materia ls were retrieved from clients before leaving a meeting. KPMG staff 
were advised to clean out their files and not to retain some information. The Senate 
Committee was also unhappy in that it believed that contrary to professional rules and 
regulations, the firm charged “contingency fees”  for selling tax avoidance schemes to 
audit clients (p. 15).  
 
Over the years, thousands of corporations had been approached by KPMG to 
aggressively sell its tax products. Extensive pressure was placed on staff, including 
professional accountants and lawyers, to sell the firm’s generic tax products. One 
internal e-mail asked staff to “temporarily defer non-revenue producing activities” 
and concentrate for the “next 5 months” on meeting revenue goals for the year”, and 
added “Listed below are the tax product identified by the functional teams as having 
significant revenue potential over the next few months……”. Another senior person 
said, “We are dealing with ruthless execution - hand to hand combat - blocking and 
tackling.’ Whatever the mixed metaphor, let’s just do it.” (pp. 8-9) ….. “you must 
respond aggressively at every opportunity” (p.50). Staff were advised to tell some 
clients that some products were no longer available, “apparently hoping that reverse 
psychology would then cause the client to want to buy the product” (p. 9). There was 
guidance on how to convince sceptical clients (p. 58) with phrases such as “Many of 
the [KPMG] specialists are ex-IRS employee; …. Many sophisticated clients have 
implemented the strategy in conjunction with their outside counsel; ….. call the client 
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and say that the firm has decided to cap the strategy … and the cap is quickly filling 
up” p. 59). Some clients were worried about possible future litigation by the tax 
authorities and such uncertainties were mediated by securing ‘opinion letters’19 from 
selected lawyers and by telling buyers that they could purchase suitable insurance 
cover from named insurance companies. 
 
The US Inland Revenue Service (IRS) requires firms to register certain kind of tax 
products, but the Senate report noted that “Despite its 500 active tax product 
inventory KPMG has never registered, and thereby disclosed to the IRS the existence 
of, a single one of its tax products ……..” (p. 13), possibly because it believed tha t its 
products were beyond the scope of the legislation. However, the Senate report refers 
to an internal e-mail, in which a senior KPMG official suggested that the firm should 
not register its tax products with the IRS, even if required by law because the IRS was 
not vigorously enforcing the registration requirements and that the penalties were 
much less than the potential profits. The KPMG calculated that based “upon our 
analysis of the applicable penalty sections, we conclude that the penalties would be no 
greater than $14,000 per $100,000 in KPMG fees. ... For example, our average 
[OPIS20] deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum penalty 
exposure of only $31,000.” The senior tax professional also warned that if KPMG 
were to comply with the tax shelter registration requirement, this action would place 
the firm at such a competitive disadvantage in its sales that KPMG would “not be able 
to compete in the tax advantaged products market” (p. 13).  
 
A KPMG tax partner told the Subcommittee that the tax strategies “represent an 
earlier time” and that the firm now does not sell “any aggressive tax strategies 
specifically designed to be sold to multiple clients21”. After the Senate hearings, the 
firm announced a number of organisational and personne l changes (The Observer, 25 
January 2004) and Senator Carl Levin stated that the Subcommittee “investigation 
                                                 
19 The Senate report states that “KPMG had drafted its own prototype tax opinion 
letter supporting the product and used this prototype as a template for the letters it 
actually sent to its clients. In addition …….  KPMG arranged for an outside law firm 
to provide a second favourable opinion letter” (p. 11). 
20 This is an acronym for a tax product. 
21 Evidence given on 18 November 2003 by Philip Weisner; http://govt-
aff.senate.gov/_files/111803weisner.pdf; accessed 21 November 2003. 
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revealed a culture of deception inside KPMG's tax practice. If the changes announced 
by KPMG today represent a real reform of that culture, they are welcome22”. 
However, a number of newspapers, citing new internal e-mails of the firm released by 
the Subcommittee, reported that the firm’s “efforts to create and sell dozens of tax 
shelters appear much more rigorous and extensive than detailed in documents made 
public [in 2003] by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations” (New 
York Times, 26 August 2004; also see International Herald Tribune, 26 August 2004; 
Washington Times, 26 August 2004). The firm reaffirmed its commitment to reform.  
 
Though the Subcommittee initially focused upon KPMG, other major firms were also 
found to be deeply involved in the tax avoidance industry. For example, a further 
report (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005) stated that Ernst 
& Young “sold generic tax products to multiple clients despite evidence that some 
…… were potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters” (p. 6) and may have netted the 
firm $27.8 million in fees (p. 87). An internal e-mail of the firm noted “we have great 
inventory of ideas. Let’s keep up the R&D to stay ahead of legislation and IRS 
movements” (p. 83). Likewise, the Senate Subcommittee found that 
PricewaterhouseCoopers also sold generic tax products which were “potentially 
abusive or illegal tax shelters” (p. 7 and 93).  
 
3.2 Sales Taxes 
 
With pressure on corporate taxes, some states have shifted taxes to consumption23 (or 
sales). However, this too has attracted the attention of the tax avoidance industry. In 
common with other members of the European Union (EU) Britain raises tax revenues 
by levying Value Added Tax (VAT) on the supply of most goods and services24. In 
essence, the supplier charges tax (“output tax”) at a statutory rate (currently 17.5%) on 
sales. The supplier can offset the VAT paid on purchases (“input tax”) against the 
output tax and the difference is settled with payments/receipts to the Customs & 
Excise Department. This way the business acts as a tax collector and the net effect of 
                                                 
22 http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=217068; accessed 15 January 
2004; also see The Observer, 25 January 2004. 
23 Such policies are regressive and tend to hurt the less well-off. 
24 There are a number of exemptions (e.g. food, children’s clothing, books, 
newspapers) and lower rates for power and household fuel. 
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the tax falls on the ultimate consumer. However, there is a potential for increasing 
corporate earnings if companies can claim relief for the ‘input tax’ and somehow 
forego the payment of ‘output tax’ to the authorities. A scheme to achieve this was 
devised by KPMG and contested by the UK Customs authorities (London Tribunal 
Centre25, 2002). The scheme hinged around interpretations of the EU Directives (e.g. 
Sixth Directive, Thirteenth Directive) incorporated in to the UK law. The Thirteenth 
Directive contains provisions for VAT on expenses to be refunded to businesses that 
are established outside the EU but supply goods and services to UK entities. If a 
business entity established outside the UK could show that it bought goods and 
services in the UK and thus had ‘input tax’ but is not involved in the sale of goods and 
services in the UK, and is thus not liable to register for VAT purposes, it could then 
seek a recover the amount of ‘input tax’. The KPMG scheme involved setting up 
skeletal operations  and control structures on Guernsey, part of the Channel Islands, to 
show that the UK operations were controlled from Guernsey26. The idea was to show 
that the Channel Islands resident company is incurring VAT on its purchases in the 
UK, but is not making taxable supplies and nor is it established in the UK27. Thus it 
did not have to register for the collection and payment of ‘output tax’ to the UK 
Customs and Excise authorities.  
 
The scheme flowed from a cold-call (6 January 2000) from KPMG, which had no 
previous relationship with the company, to Mr Garland, a director of UK-based RAL 
Holdings Group. The firm offered to make a presentation of a possible VAT savings 
in respect of gaming and amusement machines subject to a confidentiality undertaking 
being given (London Tribunal Centre, 2002, para 9). On 28 January the presentation 
titled "KPMG's VAT Mitigation Proposals for Gaming and Amusement Machines" 
was given to company directors. It contrasted £4.2 million VAT then payable with a 
nil liability using a Channel Islands company ("CICo"). CICo would recover VAT on 
the site rental, if opted for tax, and on the machines. KPMG would charge £75,000 for 
an evaluation report and counsel's opinion and a fee of 25 per cent of the first year's 
                                                 
25 A transcript of the case, details and judgement is available on 
http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/decisions/seldecisions/decision/v17914.ht
m; accessed 28 February 2004. 
26 The Channel Islands (including Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark) are UK 
Crown Dependencies but are neither part of the UK nor the European Union.   
27 In many ways the position is no different from that of a tourist who visits London, 
buys goods and then seeks to reclaim the VAT paid on those purchases. 
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VAT savings, 15 per cent of the second and 5 per cent of the next three year's savings. 
The biggest benefit of the scheme was claimed to be “enhanced shareholder value” 
(para 70). The “predominant aim is to increase group profitability by reducing the 
amount of VAT paid by the group after taking account of VAT recovered by the 
group” (para 70(18)). 
 
In March 2000, KPMG were formally appointed advisers to the company and in due 
course presented a 16 page report (15 Jun 2000) containing details of the scheme. The 
scheme, as explained to the London Tribunal, related to gaming machines operated in 
the UK by companies in the RAL Holdings Ltd group. Under the scheme gaming 
machines in 127 amusement arcades in the UK were to be leased to a newly formed 
Channel Islands subsidiary company, which was granted licences by a group company 
in the UK to use the arcades. Another UK subsidiary contracted with the Channel 
Islands company was to provide the staff at the arcades. Under the plan, all the 
gaming machine operations would take place in the UK except accounting and 
"machine management" and complaints handling which would take place from 
Guernsey in the Channel Islands. The UK operations had 600 staff compared to two 
full-time staff and two part-time directors in Guernsey. The basis of the scheme was 
that the place of supply of gaming machine services to customers would be shown to 
be in Guernsey and that the Channel Islands company would be entitled to repayment 
of input tax on supplies made to it without being liable to any output tax. Before the 
scheme, a single UK subsidiary made the supplies and output tax was paid to the 
Customs authorities. 
 
The KPMG ‘action plan’ listed 83 steps necessary to make the scheme work. These 
included matters such as the creation of the appropriate group structures, appointment 
of directors, place of board meetings, details of employee contacts and details of 
operations. The 16 page KPMG report also acknowledged possible challenges from 
the UK authorities and stated that “In our view HM Customs & Excise ('Customs') 
will regard these planning arrangements as 'unacceptable tax avoidance' and will seek 
to challenge the arrangements. However, a similar concept for telecommunications 
ran for nearly four years in most Member States of the EU before the UK, French and 
German Governments secured the unanimous agreement of all 15 Member States to 
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amend the primary legislation and stop the concept” and added “Since at the moment 
we are not aware of any widespread use of these planning arrangements, and the fact 
(sic) that some EU Member States do not charge VAT on gaming machine income, 
unanimous agreement to amend the EC legislation could be difficult to achieve” (para 
22 of the Tribunal judgement). The report also stated that prior advice from KPMG 
must be taken on VAT and direct tax issues before new sites or businesses are 
acquired to ensure the benefits of the new arrangements are not prejudiced. 
 
After implementing the tax avoidance scheme, refunds of nearly £6.6 million were 
sought and refused by the UK Customs authorities. The decision hinged on whether 
the taxable supplies (or sales) were made by “fixed establishments” in the UK or in 
Guernsey. The VAT Tribunal dismissed the claim for refunds because it considered 
that the fixed establishments at the arcades in the UK constituted the place of supply. 
The company and KPMG28 subsequently appealed to the European Court of Justice 
and a preliminary decision by the EU Advocate General declared the avoidance 
scheme to be 'unacceptable' on the ground that such a state of affairs would distort 
competition within the EU (The Observer, 30 January 2005). 
 
3.3 Payroll Taxes 
 
 
With globalisation and the nesting of corporations and wealthy individuals in 
‘fictitious spaces’ facilitated by tax havens (Roberts, 1994), many states have been 
obliged to increase taxes on less mobile capital and employment. In the UK, all 
employed persons are obliged to pay two types of direct taxes. These are ‘income tax’ 
and ‘National Insurance Contributions (NIC). The NICs act like tax on earnings but 
their payment entitles individuals to certain social security benefits and a state pension. 
Above a pre-defined threshold, all employed persons, including the self-employed, are 
required to make payments. Generally, higher earners are expected to pay more. 
                                                 
28 Many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are also becoming concerned 
about organaised  tax avoidance and its social consequences. In January 2005, KPMG 
was awarded an international prize, awarded by the world’s leading NGOs, for 
“corporate irresponsibility" for promoting aggressive tax avoidance (The Guardian, 27 
January 2005). The related press related press release is available on the AABA 
website (http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/DAVOS.pdf) together with the speech 
justifying the selection of KPMG (http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/Davosspeech.pdf). 
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However, the NIC also functions as an employment tax in that the employer is obliged 
to pay an amount per employee, determined by the salary of the employee, to the 
Inland Revenue. Thus the typical total cost of employing a person consists of salary, 
NIC and any pension contributions. Since this increases the employment costs for 
companies, the tax avoidance industry has developed a variety of schemes to enable 
companies and high earners to avoid payroll taxes.  
 
For many years, directors and owners of a major UK mobile phone distributor paid 
themselves mostly in gold bars and fine wine to avoid paying NIC (Mail on Sunday, 
15 February 2004). In 1997, the government introduced legislation to plug these tax 
loopholes. However, following an Ernst & Young inspired scheme, the higher paid  
employees and directors could avoid  NIC and taxes by securing payments through 
offshore employee benefit trusts (UK Inland Revenue Special Commissioners, 2002). 
Under the scheme 29, companies paid money into the trusts, which qualified as a 
business expense and were thus tax deductible. The ‘trust’ then ‘lent’ money to the 
employees. As long as the loan carried interest, no tax was paid by the company or the 
employee. In 2003, the UK government plugged some of the loopholes, but the Inland 
Revenue lost its High Court appeal to clawback the loss of earlier tax and 
contributions. 
 
Many UK banks and financial institutions paid bonuses to high earning employee in 
currencies that are likely to decline in value. For a considerable period they chose the 
Turkish lira, the Argentine peso and the Brazilian real to avoid taxes. A Grant 
Thornton partner said, “We chose the Turkish lira because it is virtually guaranteed to 
fall in value and it has not disappointed. Many of my clients use this scheme”. An 
Ernst & Young partner added that a “large proportion” of financial institutions had 
adopted the scheme. “Since the government started hiking National Insurance 
payments there has been a rush to think up ingenious avoidance schemes” (The 
Times, 1 December 2002). Under the scheme staff are given loans in foreign 
currencies that are likely to fall in value against pound sterling. For example, a 
currency trader expecting a bonus of £1 million receives a loan of 4,778 billion 
                                                 
29For details, see http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/decisions/seldecisions/ 
decision/spc00331.htm; accessed 15 December 2004. 
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Turkish lira30, which is equivalent to say £2m. The trader converts the lira into 
sterling and if the value of lira declines, he gains. Suppose the value of lira falls by 
50%, then the trader would only need to spend £1 million to buy 4,778 billion lira and 
repay the loan. In the process, the trader makes a gain of £1 million and his employer 
can offset any loss on loans against its tax liability. Neither the employee nor the 
employer has to pay an NIC on the bonus secured by the trader.  
 
Another scheme, marketed by PricewaterhouseCoopers, involved the use of offshore 
companies for the benefit of high earners (Daily Telegraph, 14 November 2002). 
Under the plan, staff invited to join the scheme are required to forego the traditional 
annual discretionary bonus awards. Instead they are given awarded units or shares in 
offshore companies based in Jersey and the Isle of Man,  priced at one pence each, 
which are redeemable at £100. Staff are granted ten separate series of units and each 
series matures on a different anniversary of the date the units were granted, over a 
period of ten years and thus defers the tax liability for ten years. PwC has marketed 
the scheme to a number of leading investment banks (Daily Mail, 15 November 2002) 
and it is estimated to save the participating companies around 12% of their payroll 
costs. A UK Treasury minister told parliament that “for too long some employers and 
employees with the benefit of sophisticated tax advice have sought to avoid their 
responsibilities and to pass more of a burden onto the rest of us” and that despite 
“extensive reforms to the tax legislation in 2003, employers and the ir advisers are 
continuing to devise and operate ever more contrived avoidance schemes. One such 
example of which Inland Revenue has learnt involves payment of a bonus to an 
employee in the form of dividends on shares in a specially constructed company. This 
avoids tax at 40 per cent. And employer and employee NICs” (Hansard, House of 
Commons Debates, 2 December 2004, col. 45WS). 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
 
In the sociological literature, accountancy firms are regarded as a profession and 
assigned baggage of social responsibility and ethical conduct. However, this 
overlooks that major firms are a ‘fraction’ of capital with global presence and 
                                                 
30 This example used the old exchange rates for the Turkish lira. In January 2005, 
Turkey launched a revalued currency. 
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networks (Hampton, 1996). As fractions of capital, firms have always operated in 
intensely competitive arenas, competing with both other fractions of capital and also 
amongst themselves to sell products and services. This competition generates pressure 
on profitability and the need to continually develop new products and find 
commercial ways of selling their services. To increase profits, major firms mobilise 
individualist discourses and encourage their clients to report higher earnings, often 
with little regard for the collective social consequences. They have created elaborate 
corporate structures, and marketing techniques to sell tax avoidance schemes to 
corporations and rich clients. These are developed and marketed through a network of 
banks and lawyers and sold with considerable emphasis on secrecy and 
confidentiality.  
 
The publicly available evidence cited in this paper shows that major firms deploy 
elaborate techniques for cold-calling and reassuring sceptical clients. At least one firm 
performed a private cost-benefit analysis to decide that the profits for marketing a 
scheme considerably exceeded the likely penalties for selling dubious schemes and 
then proceeded to sell the tax avoidance schemes. On occasions, firms themselves 
have suspected that they may be engaged in 'unacceptable tax avoidance', but  
nevertheless sold the schemes. The so-called ‘Chinese Walls’ do not seem to prevent 
the firms from selling tax avoidance schemes to audit clients and then claiming to 
independently attest the resulting transactions. In selling tax avoidance schemes, the 
firms regard company directors as clients rather than other stakeholders who may 
have to suffer the possible consequences of lower social investment. Within highly 
commercialised accountancy firms there is a fundamental shift “from providing one-
to-one tax advice in response to tax inquiries to also initiating, designing and mass 
marketing of tax shelter products” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2005, p. 9).  
 
The highly commercialised tax avoidance industry operates in most countries. As 
Enron and other episodes show, developing and transitional economies countries are 
also affected and are deprived of vital revenues for their social investment. Due to 
lack of social investment, many fellow human beings are unable to secure the basic 
essentials of healthcare, education, transport, sanitation, clean water, pensions and 
other public goods. Tax avoidance also distorts ‘fair competition’ so beloved by neo-
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liberals. It enables major corporations and their rich patrons to avoid making social 
contributions, something smaller capital or less mobile capital cannot. The obvious 
logic to this is that all businesses should avoid taxes. However, this also poses major 
dilemmas in that without adequate revenues, the necessary social order and legitimacy 
that is so necessary for the smooth accumulation of profits cannot be maintained. 
 
Organised and aggressive tax avoidance raises major questions about the assumed 
social responsibility and ethics of accountancy firms and their rich clients, but such 
issues attract little attention in the bourgeoning corporate social responsibility and 
accounting literature (Christensen and Murphy, 2004) even though some of the 
episodes are regularly reported in newspapers (Bougen et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 
2002). Through tax avoidance, accountancy firms are engaged in direct trans fers of 
wealth and bring them into direct conflict with the state and civil society. Their trade 
results in ordinary citizens having to accept inferior public goods, lower quality of life 
and for this worsening scenario, ironically, end up paying higher taxes, often for 
crumbling social infrastructure whilst corporations demand more public subsidies and 
the rich exclude themselves physically from society by retiring to private gated 
estates. The result is a fundamental shifting of tax burdens. For example, the UK 
income tax take of £48.8 billion for 1989-90 increased to £114 billion in 2003-200431 
whilst for the same period, despite record company profits and average rates of return 
of 11.5% against an annual inflation rate of 3-4%, the take from corporate taxes 
increased from £21.5 billion to only £28.1 billion32. Corporate share of total UK tax 
take has dropped from 11.5 per cent in 1997/98 to 7.7 per cent in 2003/2004 (BDO 
Stoy Hayward, 2004) and amounts to less than 2.5% of the British GDP, the lowest 
ever (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005). Some 65,000 rich individuals are estimated to have 
paid little or no income tax (The Independent, 28 October 2004) and top fifth of 
earners pay a smaller proportion of their income in tax than the bottom fifth (New 
Statesman, 7 March 2005). In the US, corporate tax receipts have dropped from an 
average of 4.8 percent of GDP during the 1950s to 1.3 percent of GDP in 200333. 
                                                 
31 Nearly four million individuals, the highest ever, are paying income tax at the 
highest rate of 40% which begins to bite at taxable earnings of around £30,000. 
32 http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/stats/tax_receipts/table1-2.pdf; accessed on 11 
November 2004. 
33 http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=45142; accessed 
11 April 2004. 
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Sociological literature draws attention to a close (but complex) relationship between 
the state and accountancy profession (Johnson, 1972, 1980) which enables the state to 
manage and displace its crisis of legitimacy (Sikka and Willmott, 1995b). Such 
theories now face additional layers of complexity as accountancy firms develop and 
market tax avoidance schemes that have a potential to deprive the state of large 
amounts of tax revenues. The erosion of tax revenues can threaten the legitimacy of 
the state by undermining its ability to provide public goods and the carefully 
propagated belief that it addresses common social interests (Hampton and 
Christensen, 2002). The global tax avoidance industry poses serious challenges to the 
future of democracy and the nation-state itself. Elected governments may be 
mandated by citizens to raise and spend tax revenues on healthcare, education, 
pensions, clean water, transport and other essentials, but the highly commercialised 
tax avoidance industry is no respecter of such mandates. In appeasing major 
corporations and rich individuals, the tax avoidance industry may market dubious 
avoidance schemes that erode tax revenues and thus prevent governments from 
carrying out their democratically agreed mandate. The tax avoidance industry thus 
effectively vetoes the will of the people and in the process undermines public 
confidence in the democratic process. Major accountancy firms have used their 
financial and political resources to oppose major curbs on the sale of tax avoidance 
schemes although periodically - in an attempt to ‘catch up’ - some states revise anti-
avoidance legislation and have held inquiries to expose some blatant tax avoidance 
schemes. This may bring some temporary relief but has so far failed to check the 
distorted enterprise culture which values private profits more highly than social 
investment through taxes. The possibilities of curbing the tax avoidance industry are  
further complicated because “globalisation and technological change has made it 
easier to avoid paying taxes so you have to introduce more anti-avoidance measures 
just to stand still [and] government’s attempts to raise revenues by tackling tax 
avoidance will inevitably be countered by the tax planning industry” (Financial 
Times, 9 March 2005). Indeed, anarchy of the markets only recognises financial 
rewards and a partner of a major accountancy firm has stated that “No matter what 
legislation is in place, the accountants and lawyers will find a way around it. Rules are 
rules, but rules are meant to be broken” (The Guardian, 18 March 2004).  
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A sustained focus upon the tax avoidance industry offers rich possibilities for 
interdisciplinary research (Hasseldine and Li, 1999) as it provides a window for 
studying some of the major questions facing the world today and opens up fresh 
perspectives on the role of accounting, accountants, other professionals (e.g. lawyers 
and bankers), trajectories of entrepreneurial culture, corporate social responsibility, 
poverty, corporate power, world trade, corporate governance, ethics, limits of law, 
futures of the state, democracy, corporate power, global geopolitics, and 
reconstitution of global political economy and much more. The evidence can also help 
us to revise theories of the state, globalisation and the professions and enable 
development of new vocabularies, public policies and agendas to highlight the 
predatory nature of capitalism and anti-social activities of professions. 
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